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Gilbert Ryle, William Alston, and others. Her conclusion is that some emo-
tions, such as being horny, seem to require having a body, and so God 
would not have that emotion (but that does not imply that God could not 
know what it is like to feel that emotion), but, she argues, emotions such 
as love, compassion, anger, and jealousy do not require that the experi-
encer have a body; therefore it is conceivable that an incorporeal being 
experiences those emotions.
As to the editorial state of Thinking Through Feeling, there are more 
proofreading errors than there should have been, and not just typos. A 
bigger complaint is about the size of the print. Scrutton’s book is valuable 
and is part of a valuable series, the Continuum Studies in Philosophy of Re-
ligion. I would rather see these books in paperback with larger print than 
in hardback with print of its current size. It is hard enough to struggle 
with dense, abstract prose without also having to struggle with the size 
of the print (or is it just me ol’ eyes?). However, my biggest editorial 
complaint is that it is not always clear what Scrutton’s own position is 
when she is discussing other authors, which is most of the time. She often 
seems to be taking a position, or to be about to, but then she doesn’t. The 
good news is that she does a good job of clarifying her own positions at 
the end of each chapter and in some chapter summaries, but she needs 
to be clearer about her own position as she goes along or she needs to 
develop a way of not making the reader guess as to whether she is taking 
a position.
Thinking Through Feeling contains a helpful bibliography and many use-
ful footnotes. It should definitely become part of the literature discussed 
by all who are interested in philosophy of emotion and the nature of God 
or just in philosophy of the emotions. Scrutton is a rich, articulate resource 
on these topics. I could have spent more time contending with some of her 
claims and arguments, but my main objective in this review is to alert the 
community of those who are interested in philosophy of the emotions and 
the nature of God that there is a valuable new book that should be read, 
discussed, and responded to.
The Reality of God and the Problem of Evil, by Brian Davies. New York: Con-
tinuum, 2006. 264 pages. $44.95 (paperback).
R. DOUGLAS GEIVETT, Biola University
Many have thought that evil constitutes a reason to believe that God does 
not exist, either because the co-existence of God and evil is logically impos-
sible, or because evils of a certain sort make it likely that God does not exist.
What is the logic of this problematic? The answer depends on how other 
questions are addressed. What sort of thing is God? What sort of thing is 
evil? How are the two related? Much debate about the problem proceeds 
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without careful consideration of these questions. Theists and anti-theists 
agree in accepting some basic sketch of theism, generally thought to be or-
thodox, and in identifying some clear cases of evil in the world. Anti-theists 
demand to know how God, supposed to be morally perfect and omnipo-
tent, can be justified in permitting the evils in question; theists reply, on 
God’s behalf, with various strategies of moral justification.
Brian Davies argues that this customary approach to the relation of God 
and evil goes seriously astray. Both theists and anti-theists are blamed for 
conceptual confusions about God and evil. It is time, he thinks, to get back 
to the “basics.”
This means that we must first address two fundamental questions: (1) 
Does God exist? and (2) What sort of being is God? There is no chance of 
discerning the theological significance of evil if we do not first have some 
clear conception of God’s nature and an understanding of the positive 
grounds for believing that God exists.
Davies sets the stage in Chapter 1, “The Problem of Evil,” first with a 
recapitulation of three philosophically distinct arguments from evil, fol-
lowed by a review of seven prominent theistic responses:
(i) The “We Know that God Exists” Argument, adumbrated by Augustine and 
Aquinas, according to which good reason to think that God exists consti-
tutes good reason to accept the co-existence of God and evil;
(ii) The Unreality of Evil Argument, associated most starkly and implausibly 
with Mary Baker Eddy, but more plausibly represented in Thomas Aquinas’ 
doctrine of evil as privation;
(iii) The Free Will Defense, notably developed by Alvin Plantinga in response 
to the problem of moral evil;
(iv) The Means and Ends Approach, prominently represented by Richard 
Swinburne and John Hick, who, in distinctive ways, marshall accounts of 
goods that necessitate the existence of evils of certain kinds;
(v) The “We Can’t See All the Picture” Argument, where the idea, as William 
Alston, Peter van Inwagen, and Stephen Griffith have argued, is that we are 
ignorant of the means at God’s disposal to ensure that all the evil that exists 
is morally justified by some good purpose;
(vi) an interrogative strategy that asks What kind of world can we expect from 
God? challenging anti-theistic assumptions about God’s creative possibilities 
and intentions.
(vii) the God suffers also proposal, invoked by Jürgem Moltmann and Jon So-
brino, but which Davies rules to be unorthodox on their construal of divine 
suffering.
It emerges, in due course, that Davies endorses versions of (i), (ii), (v), and 
(vi), and is especially critical of standard versions of (iii), (iv), and (vii).
Davies turns next to the “study of God” that must proceed prior to 
sorting out God’s relation to evil. Chapter 2, “God the Creator,” is spe-
cially concerned with the question “Is there any reason to believe in God?” 
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Chapter 3, “Identifying God,” takes the question “What should we sup-
pose God to be?”
Davies concentrates in chapter 2 on two versions of the cosmological 
argument, one in answer to the question, “What accounts (or accounted) 
for the fact that the universe began to exist?” and the other in answer to the 
question, “What accounts for the existence of the universe at any time?” 
(i.e., “How come the universe, whether or not it had a beginning?”). He 
develops the second argument in greater detail and methodically replies 
to anticipated objections. The upshot, in either case, is that the universe 
was created and that it therefore has a Creator. This Creator is God, under 
the description “whatever it is that makes things to be for as long as they 
are” (52).
Chapter 3 carries the argument further, through an analysis of what it 
means for God to be the source of everything other than himself (54). God 
must be “radically different from anything with which we are acquainted” 
(54), so that no creature provides an apt model for understanding God. 
And yet, using analogical reasoning and the via negativa, “we may truly 
speak of God while using terms (words) that we employ when talking 
of creatures” (54). This line of reasoning yields two especially important 
truths. First, as Creator, God is unchanging. Second, God cannot be re-
garded as a moral agent in any unqualified sense.
Chapter 4, “God’s Moral Standing,” is concerned with the claim, so of-
ten made by theists and anti-theists alike, that God, should God exist, is 
morally good. Davies argues that this claim is mistaken, for to think of God 
as morally good is to assume that God is a moral agent. Davies denies that 
God is a moral agent, and grounds his denial, first, in his earlier conclu-
sion that God is Creator, and second, lest his orthodoxy be challenged, in 
an interpretation of key passages in the Christian scriptures.
Chapters 5 and 6, “How Not to Exonerate God: I” and “How Not to Ex-
onerate God: II,” advise theists against the use of theodicies and defenses 
that attribute a moral standing to God. Other reasons are emphasized as 
well. For example, the Free Will Defense is repudiated on the grounds that 
its conception of God’s relation to human freedom is confused. Davies 
argues that God (if he exists) could, as some anti-theists have supposed, 
create de novo free creatures who never sin.
Chapter 7, “Evil, Causation and God,” is taken up with questions about 
the origin of evil. Here Davies develops and defends the doctrine of evil 
as privation, which holds that evil is neither a substance nor the property 
of a thing, and so is not caused to “exist.” Though evil is the absence of 
some good that should be where it isn’t, evil has no existence as such. So 
everything that exists is good, and is created by God. This explains why 
God cannot be considered the cause of any evil. Created beings may bring 
it about that some evil occurs, acting for something they desire. The bring-
ing about of any evil is always dependent on the possession of properties 
that are themselves good.
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In Chapter 8, “Goodness, Love and Reasons,” Davies is back to consider-
ing what it means to call God good, and here relates his earlier conclusions 
to the love of God and the demand for reasons God has for permitting evil. 
He purports to show that even if God is not “morally good,” God is meta-
physically good. God is the source of all created goods. Because God is not 
an item in the world he has created, God is not subject to the vicissitudes 
of time, and so is unchanging. There is, then, no way in which God might 
“improve.” Since a cause expresses its nature in its effects, and every cre-
ated existent is good (there being no cause of evil, as such), God’s goodness 
is exhibited in his work as Creator. In this respect, God is metaphysically 
perfect. Divine perfection, though it “does not entail moral excellence on 
God’s part” (202), does entail that God is essentially good.
As for love, God does not love in any sense that would mean that God 
has emotions. For any being to have emotions, it must be something that 
can be acted upon and undergo change. Further, though God does will 
good for his creatures (indeed, he wills them into existence, which is a 
good), there is no metaphysical possibility of reciprocity of love (in the 
usual sense) between God and his creatures. As the Creator of every exist-
ing good in the world, his love is already expressed in creation. There is no 
good that God does not create, which could in turn be something that God 
might respond to in love. God does, however, as the source of good, evoke 
love for God in his creatures.
Those who remain troubled by the apparent mystery of God’s reasons 
for allowing the evils there are must consider that God, for whom every 
act is an act of creating some good thing, does not act for reasons—if that 
means that God seeks to achieve some desire that God has. For God does 
not need anything, and so does not have desires.
Chapter 9, “God, Evil and Goodness,” inverts the argument from evil 
against theism with an appeal to explain the existence of goodness in the 
world. The last few pages of this chapter direct attention to distinctly 
Christian doctrines—and in particular the doctrine of the Trinity—to fur-
ther indicate how God’s goodness and love are manifest in ways that mat-
ter to humanity in the face of evil.
In a final Appendix, titled “Is God Morally Indifferent?” Davies ac-
knowledges that God is morally indifferent in any sense that presupposes 
that God is a moral agent. But he denies that this is any kind of deficiency, 
since God is not the sort of being who is subject to the moral demands 
placed upon human creatures whose natures make them proper subjects 
of such evaluation. God is not indifferent, as if he might behave better 
than he does if he really cared. There is no question of behaving better 
with God.
Brian Davies is an able guide to the metaphysics of theism developed 
by Thomas Aquinas, whom he follows closely on many points. This book 
is especially valuable for bringing sympathetic exposition of Aquinas 
to bear on contemporary discussions of the problem of evil. The author 
boldly objects to the usual terms of debate about God and evil. He is as 
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scrupulous in assessing theistic responses to the problem as he is in re-
plies to anti-theists. His key concern is with thinking of God “as an agent 
subject to moral requirements and, therefore, as intelligibly defensible or 
impugnable with reference to them” (96). The argument of this book is far 
more subtle than can be conveyed here. Perhaps we have been too casual 
in our assumptions about what it means for God to be good, or even in our 
assumption that we can know what it means. The implications of Davies’s 
claims about God’s goodness and love for humanity will be shocking to 
some—more so if they misunderstand the argument. A follow-up volume 
on the nature of Christian experience of God would be a welcome addi-
tion to his fine work in the philosophy of religion.
